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San bernadino dispatch call type fu4/6/2023 During a short break, Syed Farook, a fellow public health employee who had left the meeting earlier, returned with his wife, Tashfeen Malik, dressed in dark tactical military-style gear to kill his co-workers. On the morning of December 2, 2015, San Bernardino County Public Health employees gathered in a conference room inside the Inland Regional Center (IRC) in San Bernardino, California, for training and a holiday party. Inland Regional Center – San Bernardino, California Finally, the article discusses areas that require further attention so as to improve the safety of communities and first responders in the United States. This article describes the San Bernardino and Orlando attacks, identifies lessons learned during the Police Foundation’s reviews of law enforcement responses to the attacks, and highlights some of the challenges confronting the law enforcement response to terrorist events and other acts of mass public violence. In 2010, Yemeni-American terrorist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki gloated that “jihad is becoming as American as apple pie.” 2 That seemingly absurd claim, it turns out, has some merit as “domestic terrorism from all sources is endemic and shows no signs of abating,” according to research by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Their chief asset was that their plans were developed in secret, making it exceedingly difficult for law enforcement to detect or disrupt their attacks. The San Bernardino and Pulse nightclub terrorist attacks were committed by “homegrown jihadis” inspired by the Islamic State, who planned and prepared their brutal attacks hidden from the community and law enforcement. Both incidents ended in a barrage of gunfire as officers put themselves in harm’s way, confronting heavily armed suspects who fought until they were neutralized. Law enforcement personnel were challenged by the possibility that the perpetrators were wearing suicide vests and/or had placed them on hostages. In both incidents, the terrorists targeted first responders with secondary devices or the threat thereof. The situations they encountered were marked by chaos and unimaginable devastation, with overwhelming sights, sounds, and smells of human tragedy-victims begging for help, people dying, and others who were already deceased. i In both instances, patrol and traffic officers, investigators, and command personnel-not tactical teams-were the first law enforcement personnel to arrive on scene. These two events, perpetrated by individuals inspired by Islamist extremist ideology, claimed the lives of 63 innocent people and injured 75 others, shocking law enforcement officials and communities across the country. This article h focuses on the local law enforcement response to two acts of mass public violence- the terrorist attacks at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California, and the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. 1 This new reality has challenged law enforcement agencies to ensure their training, tactics, and operational procedures evolve effectively in order to confront offenders who kill and seriously injure defenseless civilians at movie theaters, a schools, b churches, c conference rooms, d nightclubs, e and iconic sporting events f as well as in mobile active shootings throughout a community. These attacks, according to a report by the Congressional Research Service in 2015, have increased in frequency as well as lethality. Some traditional practices need to be realigned and enhanced to improve the survivability of victims and the safety of first responders in an increasingly complicated threat environment.ĭuring the last decade, individuals motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and individual factors have engaged in horrific acts of mass violence targeting innocent civilians in communities across the United States. While well-defined, well-developed, and practiced protocols equipped responding officers to perform effectively during these tragic events, vital lessons have also been learned, including how to confront attackers armed or claiming to be armed with high-powered weapons and explosive devices. In both cases, the local law enforcement response required judgment calls in extremely volatile and difficult circumstances. This is also likely to be the case in future attacks. Abstract: In the terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando, the first responders were patrol and traffic officers, investigators, and command personnel, not tactical units.
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